ZyXEL Communications P-335WT Bedienungsanleitung Seite 10

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WAN
www.sane.nl
ev1l h4x0r
AddPortMapping
on port 22 to
www.sane.nl:22
22
22
Telco/LAN Router
The hack works as follows:
Let machine A ask the Speedtouch to forward all traffic on port 22 on the
external interface to port 22 on the Linksys router.
Let machine B exploit the bug in the UPnP implementation on the Linksys
router and let the router forward port 22 on the external interface to port 22
on a random host on the Internet (say www.sane.nl)
This way, if you connect to the ADSL router on port 22 from the Internet, you will
be routed to port 22 on www.sane.nl. Because all traffic will go through two NAT
devices (namely the Linksys WRT54G and the ADSL router) it will appear as if all
traffic comes from the ADSL router. The hack can be made a bit simpler if machine
B asks the ADSL router to make the portforward instead of machine A.
Of course, if the only link between the Internet and the inside network is the
WRT54G, the hack is in fact a lot simpler. In the Netherlands this situation is
not very common, since the WRT54G has no built-in ADSL modem.
More serious hacks are possible with this bug. For example, this hole could be
exploited to hijack port 25 to capture someone’s mail if a mail server is running
behind the Internet Gateway Device and port 25 on the external interface is for-
warded to the internal mailserver. Hijacking can be done by first deleting the exist-
ing portmapping for port 25 from the Internet Gateway Device and then creating
a new mapping to an external machine in the same way as is described above.
In a similar way you could redirect port 80 to another machine, and deface a website
without having to break into the webserver, or divert traffic and use it for phishing.
This bug was reported to Linksys in early february of 2006. Linksys found the
bug, but a replacement firmware was not yet available before the deadline for this
paper. Other vendors haven’t fixed it yet. The sad truth is that this bug apparently
was already known by at least one vendor. In the GPL sources tarball from US
Robotics in the file ipt.c, dated March 1 2005, there are fixes from US Robotics
which prevent this attack from happening (and as a side effect also reject forwards
to the broadcast address, making the device strictly spoken incompliant with the
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